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Articles & Other Documents:

Featured Article: [Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Arsenal Safety Endangered](#)

1. [Watchdog Finds Evidence That Iran Worked on Nuclear Triggers](#)
2. [Iran Calls Nuclear Allegations in Amano's Report "Unfounded"](#)
3. [Denuclearization a Must for N. Korean People, Unification: Minister](#)
4. [South Korea Probes Second Report of U.S. Army Chemical Dumping](#)
5. [N. Korean Leader Calls for Early Resumption of Six-Party Talks: Xinhua](#)
6. [North Korea's Kim Ends China Trip with Pledge to Purge Weapons](#)
7. [Nuclear Trade Wasn't Illegal: Dr Qadeer](#)
8. [Safety of Pak Nukes, a Global Concern: India](#)
9. [No Plans to Attack Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: TTP](#)
10. [Russian Missile Test Said to Involve New Weapon](#)
11. [Russia, U.S. may agree on European Missile Shield by 2020 - Medvedev](#)
12. [Medvedev Says Not Happy With U.S. Missile Defense Response](#)
13. [US Secretly Helped French Nuclear Program: Documents](#)
14. [White House Threatens Veto of Defense Bill](#)
15. [Final House Military Budget Handcuffs Obama on Nukes, Detainees](#)
16. [Osama Raid an 'Act of War': Musharraf](#)
17. [Take Pakistan's Nukes, Please](#)
18. [Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Arsenal Safety Endangered](#)
19. [A Worrying Development for Trident](#)
20. [Why Missile Defense Talks Will Fail](#)

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Issue No. 910, 27 May 2011

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New York Times

May 24, 2011

Watchdog Finds Evidence That Iran Worked on Nuclear Triggers

By DAVID E. SANGER and WILLIAM J. BROAD

The world's global nuclear inspection agency, frustrated by Iran's refusal to answer questions, revealed for the first time on Tuesday that it possesses evidence that Tehran has conducted work on a highly sophisticated nuclear triggering technology that experts said could be used for only one purpose: setting off a nuclear weapon.

The disclosure by the International Atomic Energy Agency was buried inside a nine-page report on the progress of Iran's nuclear program. The agency did not say where the evidence came from, nor did it provide many details about the allegations.

Statistics in the report also indicated that Iran has begun to recover from the effects of the Stuxnet computer worm, which first struck the country nearly two years ago in an apparent effort to cripple its production of nuclear fuel. Based on recent visits by inspectors, the agency concluded that Iran's main production site at Natanz is now producing low-enriched uranium at rates slightly exceeding what it produced before being hit by the Stuxnet. The computer worm appears to have been designed in a secret project in which the United States, Israel and some European allies all played a role, The New York Times reported in January.

In a separate report on Syria, the agency also laid out a detailed case, for the first time, that the country was "very likely" building a secret nuclear reactor that should have been reported to the agency. The facility was bombed by Israel in September 2007, and Syria quickly bulldozed the site, eliminating most of the evidence.

Although the C.I.A. released photographs in 2008 of the reactor building, taken before the bombing raid, the agency's inspectors in Vienna had at first been quite skeptical of any evidence provided by the Bush administration, with which they had clashed over the status of Iraq's nuclear program. But they have now come to the same conclusion that Washington came to nearly four years ago, and American officials said they plan to use the report to press the agency's board of governors at its meeting next month to refer the issue to the United Nations Security Council for possible sanctions.

"We fully expect the board of governors to address these issues with the seriousness they deserve," Glyn T. Davies, the American ambassador to the I.A.E.A., said in a telephone interview from Vienna.

But at a moment when the Syrian government is struggling to stay in power amid uprisings, the shooting of protesters in Syrian towns will almost certainly seem like a more urgent matter for the United Nations to address. The apparent effort by the Assad government to build a nuclear capacity, with help from North Korea, is likely to be viewed as what one American official called "a historical event, not an ongoing threat." Even if the reactor was solely for energy production, the country would be required to tell the agency and place the facility under its safeguards.

On Tuesday, Israel's prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, at a joint session of Congress, urged the United States not to take the threat of military action against Iran's nuclear facilities off the table.

"The ayatollah regime briefly suspended its nuclear program only once, in 2003, when it feared the possibility of military action" after the invasion of Iraq, Mr. Netanyahu said. "That same year, Muammar Qaddafi gave up his nuclear weapons program, and for the same reason. The more Iran believes that all options are on the table, the less the chance of confrontation."

Mr. Netanyahu has been far more assertive than his American counterparts in making public threats about potential military action; the Stuxnet operation, which American and Israeli officials refuse to discuss, appears to have been part of an effort to come up with a covert, nonmilitary solution.



The Stuxnet may have now run its course. David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security, a private group in Washington that tracks nuclear proliferation, analyzed the I.A.E.A. report and concluded that the jump in monthly production of enriched uranium was “the highest level that Iran has ever achieved.”

The official American and Israeli estimates suggest Iran is still at least a year, and most likely several years, from being able to produce a bomb. Iran says its nuclear program is meant only to produce energy, but many Western countries believe the country is hiding a weapons program.

The agency gave some details in Tuesday’s report on work that was apparently done on how to trigger a nuclear device, dating back to late 2003.

“The agency has not described these experiments to this detail before,” said Olli Heinonen, the agency’s former chief inspector.

Starting in early 2008, the agency has repeatedly accused Iran of dragging its feet in addressing “possible military dimensions” of its nuclear program. Tehran has declared that all of the evidence gathered by the agency — mostly from the intelligence agencies of member countries, and some from its own inspectors — are fabrications.

The I.A.E.A.’s last report, issued in February, listed seven outstanding questions about work Iran apparently conducted on warhead design. The documents in the hands of the agency raise questions about work on how to turn uranium into bomb fuel, how to cast conventional explosives in a shape that can trigger a nuclear blast, how to make detonators, generate neutrons to spur a chain reaction, measure detonation waves and make nose-cones for missiles.

Tuesday’s report gave new details for all seven of the categories of allegations. The disclosure about the atomic trigger centered on a rare material — uranium deuteride, a form of the element made with deuterium, or heavy hydrogen. Nuclear experts say China and Pakistan appear to have used the material as a kind of atomic sparkplug.

The report said it had asked Iran about evidence of “experiments involving the explosive compression of uranium deuteride to produce a short burst of neutrons” — the speeding particles that split atoms in two in a surge of nuclear energy. In a bomb, an initial burst of neutrons is needed to help initiate a rapid chain reaction.

Harold M. Agnew, a former director of the Los Alamos weapons laboratory, said the compression of uranium deuteride suggested work on an atomic trigger.

“I don’t know of any peaceful uses,” he said in an interview.

The agency’s disclosure about Iran’s alleged use of uranium deuteride also suggests another possible connection between Tehran’s program and Abdul Qadeer Khan, the rogue Pakistani engineer who sold nuclear information.

A famous photograph of Dr. Khan, whom Pakistan has released from house arrest in Islamabad, shows him in front of the schematic diagram of an atom bomb on a blackboard. A pointer to the bomb’s center is labeled uranium deuteride.

Tuesday’s report also gave fresh charges on the design of missile warheads. Documentary evidence, it said, suggested that Iran had conducted “studies involving the removal of the conventional high explosive payload from the warhead of the Shahab-3 missile and replace it with a spherical nuclear payload.”

The Shahab-3 is one of Iran’s deadliest weapons, standing 56 feet tall. In parades, Iran has draped them with banners reading, “Wipe Israel off the map.”

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/25/world/middleeast/25iran.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Iran Student News Agency (ISNA) – Iran



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May 26, 2011

Iran Calls Nuclear Allegations in Amano's Report "Unfounded"

TEHRAN (ISNA)-Iranian ambassador to the IAEA Ali Asghar Soltanieh called allegations against the country's nuclear program mentioned in Amano's recent report "unfounded and baseless."

"Issues related to alleged studies and Iran's possible military programs mentioned in the recent report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Yukiya Amano are repetitious ones," he told ISNA on Wednesday.

"The report in general has mentioned the already-discussed issues which have come in previous reports of the agency," he added.

"Amano's report represents that the IAEA inspectors continue to visit Iran's civilian nuclear facilities based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and that everything is under the organization's supervision."

He then referred to Amano's letter to Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Chief Fereidoun Abbasi which has called for Iran to answer the alleged studies and allegations over its nuclear work.

"We have already said that we had sent a 117-page report on alleged studies to the agency and proved the claims unfounded," Soltanieh continued.

He went on to say, "we will give reply to the IAEA Director General's letter. But as we have already reiterated there is no doubt that allegations against Iran's nuclear issue are unfounded and politically-motivated."

He also said the IAEA Board of Governors' next meeting would not focus on Iran but on Japan's measure following catastrophe in Fukushima power plant.

<http://www.isna.ir/ISNA/NewsView.aspx?ID=News-1775580&Lang=E>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Yonhap News – South Korea

May 25, 2011

Denuclearization a Must for N. Korean People, Unification: Minister

GWANGJU, May 25 (Yonhap) -- North Korea must abandon its nuclear weapons programs to ensure a better life for its people and unify with South Korea, Seoul's foreign minister said Wednesday.

"We provided a lot of aid (to the North) under the Sunshine Policy, but I haven't heard of improvements in the lives of the North Korean people," Kim Sung-hwan said during a lecture at Chonnam National University in this southwestern city of Gwangju, some 329 kilometers from Seoul. "That's because material aid is only consumed and does not lead to development."

The so-called Sunshine Policy formed the core of Seoul's North Korea policy in the late 1990s and early 2000s, during which the late former presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun sent unconditional food aid and other supplies to the North. Nearly all of that aid has now been cut off under the conservative Lee Myung-bak administration, which has tied aid to the North's denuclearization.

"Denuclearization is absolutely necessary for unification as well," the minister said. "If we possess nuclear weapons after unification, our neighboring nations will not accept it."

The two Koreas remain technically in a state of war since the 1950-53 Korean War ended in an armistice, not a peace treaty.

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2011/05/25/67/0401000000AEN20110525005900315F.HTML>

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[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Oregon Herald

South Korea Probes Second Report of U.S. Army Chemical Dumping

By Jeremy Laurence, Reuters
Wednesday, May 25, 2011

SEOUL – South Korea opened a second investigation in days into a report that the U.S. military dumped toxic chemicals near the capital decades ago, a Defense Ministry official said on Wednesday, threatening to trigger an anti-American backlash.

Experts have been sent to the former U.S. base in Bucheon, west of Seoul, to check out the claims after South Korean media reported that a U.S. veteran had said "hundreds of gallons" of chemicals were buried there between 1963 and 1964.

The accusations could rekindle anti-American sentiment in the country, which saw big protests against the import of U.S. beef in 2008 and over the deaths of two South Korean girls hit by a U.S. military vehicle in 2002.

The United States has nearly 30,000 troops in South Korea, and the two countries are grappling with how to deal with North Korea's nuclear program.

South Korea's foreign ministry said the two countries, which are close allies, consider the issue serious, and local media called on the U.S. to come clean on the "alarming" revelations.

"Even the slightest hint that the U.S. military is hiding something could lead to widespread public distrust," the top selling Chosun Ilbo newspaper wrote in an editorial.

The latest revelations emerged after South Korean media this week uncovered comments made on the "Korean War Project," a website for ex-servicemen, a decade ago that "every imaginable chemical" had been dumped by U.S. forces at the Bucheon base between 1963-64.

The base, about 20 km (12 miles) west of Seoul, was returned to South Korea in 1993 and is now used by South Korean engineering troops.

The defense ministry official, who declined to be identified, said the Environment Ministry was also investigating the chemical dumping claims.

The U.S. military on Wednesday attempted to distance itself from the latest report. "Once the installation was returned to the ROK government, it became their responsibility," said United States Forces Korea (USFK) spokeswoman Cenethea Lofbom.

"The U.S.-ROK Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) does not impose any liability upon the U.S. government for the condition of former installations after they have been returned and accepted by the ROK government," she said, referring to South Korea by the acronym of its official name, the Republic of Korea.

The latest allegations come after three ex-servicemen revealed last week that they had buried the toxic chemical defoliant Agent Orange at Camp Carroll in Chilgok, about 300 km (200 miles) southeast of the capital, in 1978.

At the weekend, the South Korean and USFK launched a joint investigation into that report.

USFK on Monday confirmed a large amount of chemicals were buried at the site but said they had been removed more than 30 years ago.

It said a review of military records showed trace elements of dioxin had been found at the site. It did not specify what chemicals.



Agent Orange was used to clear vegetation during the Vietnam War and was also used years later around demilitarized zones on the peninsula which was divided after the 1950-1953 Korean War.

The toxic herbicide is suspected of causing serious health problems, including cancer, and birth defects.

Additional reporting by Taeyi Kim; Editing by Robert Birsell and Alex Richardson

<http://www.oregonherald.com/news/show-story.cfm?id=252397>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Yonhap News – South Korea

May 26, 2011

N. Korean Leader Calls for Early Resumption of Six-Party Talks: Xinhua

SEOUL/BEIJING, May 26 (Yonhap) -- North Korean leader Kim Jong-il called for an early resumption of the long-stalled six-party nuclear disarmament talks when he met with Chinese President Hu Jintao during his latest trip to the neighboring ally, Beijing's Xinhua News agency said Thursday.

But Pyongyang's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) gave a toned-down account, saying that Kim and Hu recognized that peaceful resolution of the nuclear standoff through dialogue, including the resumption of the six-party talks, and the "elimination of obstructive elements" conform to the overall interests in the region.

KCNA did not elaborate on what the "obstructive elements" mean.

It appeared the two agencies coordinated the timing of their dispatches that marked the first time the sides have confirmed Kim's secretive, weeklong trip to China, the North's last-remaining major ally that has propped up the impoverished regime with aid and diplomatic support.

The two sides typically reveal details of Kim's Chinese trips only after he returns home.

"Kim said the DPRK hopes to ease tensions on the Korean Peninsula, sticks to the objective of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and believes that the six-party talks should be resumed at an early date," Xinhua said, referring to the North by the acronym of its official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

"Kim said the DPRK, as always, sincerely hopes relations between the DPRK and the Republic of Korea (ROK) could be improved," Xinhua said. ROK refers to South Korea, whose official name is the Republic of Korea.

KCNA said that Kim and Hu recognized that the "adherence to the goal of denuclearization on the whole Korean Peninsula, peaceful settlement of the issue through dialogue, including the resumption of the six-party talks, and the elimination of obstructive elements conform to the overall interests of Northeast Asia."

They "shared views on making good understanding and coordination," it said.

KCNA made no mention of relations with South Korea.

The nuclear talks, involving the two Koreas, China, Japan, Russia and the U.S., have been stalled since the last session in December 2008 due to North Korea's boycott and tensions over the communist nation's two deadly attacks on the South last year.

According to Xinhua, Hu stressed the importance of peace and stability as well as denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, urging related parties to "remain calm and restrained, show flexibility, remove obstacles, improve relations and make positive efforts to ultimately accomplish peace, stability and development on the peninsula."

Kim told Hu that North Korea "is now concentrating its attention and resources on economic development, and it is in great need of a stable neighboring environment," Xinhua said, a comment seen as a plea for Chinese help in reviving the North's broken economy.



USAF COUNTERPROLIFERATION CENTER
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It was Kim's third trip to China in about a year. The latest trip, which began Friday last week, came as Kim has been grooming his youngest son, Jong-un, as his successor. Last year, the heir-apparent was given top posts at the ruling Workers' Party as well as the title of a four-star general.

KCNA said that Hu called for advancing the friendly and cooperative relations between the two countries, saying China's government and party will "creditably discharge the historic responsibility for steadfastly carrying forward the baton of the traditional Sino-DPRK friendship."

The remark suggests that China may have given its blessing to Kim's succession plan.

<http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/northkorea/2011/05/26/52/0401000000AEN20110526010400315F.HTML>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Bloomberg.com

North Korea's Kim Ends China Trip with Pledge to Purge Weapons

By Jonathan Tirone

May 26, 2011

North Korean leader Kim Jong Il ended a six-day visit to learn about China's economic growth by saying his country is still committed to eliminating its nuclear weapons through negotiations.

Chinese President Hu Jintao held talks with Kim yesterday about nuclear security and economic cooperation between the two countries, the state-run Korean Central News Agency reported. Kim arrived in China by train on May 20 and returned to North Korea today.

The two governments agreed that their interests converge in the "adherence to the goal of denuclearization on the whole Korean peninsula, peaceful settlement of the issue through dialogue, including the resumption of the six-party talks and the elimination of obstructive elements," KCNA said.

Six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear-weapons program, hosted by China and also involving Japan, South Korea, Russia and the U.S., haven't convened since December 2008. The country won't give up the program without some kind of security guarantee from the U.S., former President Jimmy Carter said during a visit to North Korea last month.

Kim's third trip to his main ally and benefactor in the past year may have been aimed at extracting more aid and trade to shore up an economy beset by international sanctions aimed at halting the regime's nuclear-weapons program, crop failures and livestock disease. China's gross domestic product jumped 14-fold in the three decades since it began experiments with market-oriented reforms, data compiled by Bloomberg show.

'New Situation'

"It is the requirement of a new period and new situation to strengthen the unity between the two parties and countries," KCNA cited Hu as saying. Chinese officials took Kim on tours of agricultural, industrial and technology centers, according to the report.

North Korea's trade with China jumped 30 percent last year even after the United Nations stepped up sanctions following its second nuclear test in May 2009, according to China's Commerce Ministry.

Kim, 69, made his trip as a U.S. delegation visited North Korea to survey the country's food shortages. Kim last visited China in August, a month before his youngest son, Kim Jong Un, was appointed to the second-highest military post within the ruling Workers' Party of Korea. The August trip was the elder Kim's second to China in 2010.

<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-26/north-korea-s-kim-ends-china-trip-with-pledge-to-purge-weapons.html>

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[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

The Nation – Pakistan

Nuclear Trade Wasn't Illegal: Dr Qadeer

By The Nation Monitoring
May 26, 2011

Renowned nuclear scientist Dr Abdul Qadeer has said that Islamabad's purchase and sale of atomic equipment with any foreign company could not be termed as illegal as Pakistan is not a signatory of the Non-proliferation Treaty.

Dr Abdul Qadeer, who spent five years in house arrest following charges of selling nuclear details to Libya and other countries in 2004, told the BBC via telephone on Wednesday, "I'm not authorised to give a formal interview to any media representative".

He said the use of the term 'illegal' for Pakistan's nuclear programme was not a new thing as it had been in practice for long time since the acceleration of the work on the project in ZiaulHaq's regime. "ZiaulHaq had directed all his officials, including the foreign minister, to respond to foreigners' questions by saying that Islamabad is not a signatory to any international law," DrQadeersaid, adding, "The same answer is valid even today". He went on to say, "If we have not signed any treaty, there is no question of terming our trade as illegal."

<http://nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Politics/26-May-2011/Nuclear-trade-wasnt-illegal-Dr-Qadeer>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Pakistan Observer – Pakistan
Thursday, May 26, 2011

Safety of Pak Nukes, a Global Concern: India

New Delhi—India on Wednesday said the safety of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal was a matter of concern for the global community in the wake of frequent terror attacks on its military establishments.

"Naturally, it is a concern not only for us but for everybody," Defence Minister A.K. Antony told reporters here after addressing the country's naval commanders at their biannual conference that began Tuesday.

He was responding to questions whether the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal were under threat in the wake of the terror strikes such as the one at Mehran naval air base in Karachi Sunday night.

"Developments in Pakistan, especially in Karachi, are a matter of serious concern to us. We are closely monitoring and we are taking precautions also. But at the same time, we don't want to overreact. We are also concerned about the developments," Antony said.

Asked if there were any specific intelligence inputs on terror threats to India, the defence minister said he would not share it in public, but assured the nation that the three armed forces were taking the necessary precautions and monitoring the situation 24x7.

"We are aware that there is a constant threat to our security. So that is why we are taking precautions. It (security) is not a one-day affair. It is a constant exercise and we are ever vigilant," he said on a possible Lashkar-e-Taiba threat to India in the aftermath of Al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden's killing.

Asked if there was any "heightened" watch after terror attacks in Pakistan, Antony said India's constant security vigil was not only because of the situation in its neighbourhood but also because it was "always on the radar of terrorists".



"It is not a new thing. We know that there is a constant threat to our security. It is not a one-day affair. So our security forces are working 24x7 and they are ever vigilant. They are closely monitoring the situation," he added.

Antony reiterated Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's views that India would not copy the May 2 US special forces operations in Abbottabad near Islamabad in Pakistan to eliminate Osama.

Antony said attempts by terrorists to sneak into India, particularly in Jammu and Kashmir, were continuing.

"There are many terrorists waiting across the border to infiltrate into our territory, including Kashmir. But there is no increase in infiltration. Attempts are going on. But our armed forces are ever ready to prevent that. In summer, there are always more attempts of infiltration. We are ready to meet this challenge," he added.

<http://pakobserver.net/detailnews.asp?id=94161>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

The Nation – Pakistan

No Plans to Attack Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: TTP

Thursday, May 26, 2011

The Taliban have no plans to attack Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, the TTP organisation's spokesman has declared. The 17-hour siege of Karachi's Mehran Naval Station by Pakistani Taliban militants renewed disturbing questions about the Pakistan military's ability to defend sensitive installations, including its nuclear weapons.

While the Obama administration showed caution in its reaction to the Karachi siege, media outlets across the globe linked the attack to the disturbing questions over the security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons.

Taliban's spokesman Ehsanullah Ehsan, however, dismissed those concerns as America's "excuse" to pressure the Pakistan government into fighting the Taliban, who he portrayed as the country's true protectors.

"Pakistan is the only Muslim nuclear-power state," The Wall Street Journal quoted Ehsan, as saying in a telephonic interview.

He added that the Taliban had no intention of changing that fact. The Taliban, after all, aim to take over Pakistan and its weapons, the paper said.

Ehsan then mocked Pakistan's willingness to work with the United States, saying: "Isn't it a shame for us to have the Islamic bomb, and even then we are bowing down to the pressures of America?"

While the brutality of the Pakistan Taliban has alienated them from most Pakistanis, Ehsan's anti-American sentiments are shared by many people there.

The long-questioned alliance with the US has come under increased scrutiny following the May 2 raid that killed the then al-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden. The US raid was seen by most in Pakistan as a violation of national sovereignty by an unfaithful ally, the paper said.

Ehsan's remarks appeared tailored to appeal to that increasingly nationalist mainstream, where conspiracy theories flourish about American, Indian and Israeli plots to deprive Pakistan of its atomic arsenal, said the paper, adding that Pakistan's nuclear capability is cherished here as the guarantor of safety from India's far larger conventional military.

The Pakistan Taliban, an offshoot of the Afghan insurgent movement, have repeatedly tried to win public support by presenting themselves as a defender of Pakistan, though their attacks have killed thousands of Pakistanis.

Following the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks by Pakistani militants and the resulting spike in tensions with archrival India, the Taliban offered to fight alongside Pakistan's army in the event of war, the paper said.



Still, it was impossible to judge the sincerity of Ehsan's declaration regarding Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, as even if the Pakistan Taliban has no designs on the arms, there are myriad Islamist groups in Pakistan, including al Qaeda, that are believed to have interest in acquiring nuclear weapons, it added.

<http://nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Politics/26-May-2011/No-plans-to-attack-Pakistans-nuclear-weapons-TTP>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Global Security Newswire

Russian Missile Test Said to Involve New Weapon

Wednesday, May 25, 2011

Russia's submarine-launched missile test on Friday did not involve a Sineva system as was officially stated but rather a new "Liner" ICBM, *Russia Today* reported (see *GSN*, May 23).

The Russian Miass Missile Center on Tuesday revealed that the successful test actually involved a new ICBM variant that had been developed in secret. The missile could be a significantly advanced version of the Sineva, which entered into service four years ago, *Russia Today* reported (*Russia Today*, May 25).

Meanwhile, the first of Russia's fourth-generation Borei-class submarines has been put into water for final sea testing, Sevماش shipyard spokeswoman Anastasia Nikitinskaya said to ITAR-Tass (see *GSN*, April 20).

Work on the nuclear-powered *Yuri Dolgoruky* began in 1996. Shipyard testing of the vessel began in 2007 and ended in 2010. The submarine is to field the experimental Bulava missile, with an initial test launch from the vessel slated to take place in 2011.

Russia intends to construct a minimum of eight Borei-class submarines, which would form the backbone of the country's revamped sea-based nuclear deterrent (ITAR-Tass, May 24).

Separately, Russian RS-24 ICBMs are to be fielded this year with a unit at a military installation in the Ivanovo region, Interfax reported on Tuesday (see *GSN*, May 18).

"The rearmament of the RS-24 ICBM fitted with a MIRV (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle) warhead boosts the [Russian strategic missile troops] attack force's combat capability to counter missile defense systems, thus strengthening the nuclear deterrent potential of the Russian strategic nuclear forces," RSVN spokesman Col. Vadim Koval said (Interfax, May 24).

http://gsn.nti.org/gsn/nw_20110525_8113.php

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

RIA Novosti – Russian Information Agency

Russia, U.S. may agree on European Missile Shield by 2020 - Medvedev

26 May 2011

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said on Thursday that it could take Russia and the United States until 2020 to reach agreement on a European missile shield, but the two sides must create the foundations for a deal now.

"This issue will be solved in the future, maybe in 2020, but we should lay the basis for the work of a future generation of politicians, we should create the right foundation," Medvedev told journalists after a meeting with after talks with U.S. President Barack Obama in France's Deauville ahead of a G8 summit.



Obama said U.S.-Russian cooperation in the missile defense sphere should be aimed at maintaining the strategic balance between the countries and correspond to both Russian and U.S. interests.

The Russian-U.S. presidential commission announced on Thursday that it has concluded its work on a report on missile threats.

Russia and NATO agreed to cooperate on the so-called European missile shield during the NATO-Russia Council summit in Lisbon in November 2010. NATO insists there should be two independent systems that exchange information, while Russia favors a joint system.

Russia is opposed to the planned deployment of U.S. missile defense systems near its borders, claiming they would be a security threat. NATO and the United States insist that the shield will defend NATO members against missiles from North Korea and Iran and would not be directed at Russia.

During a news conference with Russian and foreign journalists outside Moscow earlier this month, Medvedev warned that Russia would have to build up its nuclear capability if NATO and the United States failed to reach an agreement with Moscow on European missile defense.

He also reiterated that Russia may pull out of the New START disarmament agreement with the United States, which entered into force this year, in response to Washington's position on the defense system.

Russia has expressed concern over the United States' refusal to provide legally binding guarantees that its plans for a European missile defense system would not be directed against Russia.

During Thursday's talks, Medvedev and Obama also discussed the situation in the Middle East and North Africa, as well as the Iranian nuclear issue.

Medvedev, Obama and French President Nicolas Sarkozy issued a joint statement on Thursday on the situation in Nagorny Karabakh, calling on the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders to agree on the core issues of the conflict settlement by an upcoming EU-Russia summit in June.

A breakaway region on Azerbaijani territory with a predominantly ethnic Armenian population, Nagorny Karabakh has been a sticking point in the two countries' relations since the late 1980s, when the region claimed independence from Azerbaijan to join Armenia. The conflict is estimated to have left more than 30,000 people dead on both sides between 1988 and 1994.

<http://en.rian.ru/world/20110526/164247894.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Business Week

Medvedev Says Not Happy With U.S. Missile Defense Response

May 27, 2011

By Henry Meyer and Lyubov Pronina

May 27 (Bloomberg) -- President Dmitry Medvedev said he is "not particularly" happy with the U.S. reaction to Russian proposals on a planned missile-defense system in Europe and warned of "a real arms race" after 2020 without a deal.

"We have to get guarantees that it will not be aimed at us," Medvedev said at a press conference today after a Group of Eight summit in Deauville, France. "No one has given us such guarantees."

Medvedev and U.S. President Barack Obama discussed missile defense in Deauville yesterday, agreeing to work together to maintain the "strategic balance."

Russia complains that the missile shield, which the U.S. says is needed to guard against threats from countries such as Iran, will blunt its nuclear deterrent. Its criticism escalated May 3, when the U.S. agreed to station interceptor



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missiles at a Romanian air base as part of a system that will also include facilities in Poland, another former Soviet bloc country.

Russia and the U.S. in February put into force the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which limits each side's strategic warheads to 1,550, from the 2,200 allowed previously, and sets a maximum of 800 land-, air- and sea-based launchers.

Editors: Andrew Langley, Willy Morris

<http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-05-27/medvedev-says-not-happy-with-u-s-missile-defense-response.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Space War. Com

US Secretly Helped French Nuclear Program: Documents

By Staff Writers

Washington, Agence France-Presse (AFP)

May 25, 2011

The United States secretly helped France develop advanced nuclear weapons in the 1970s as part of a bid by the Nixon administration to sow divisions in Europe, declassified US documents showed.

Henry Kissinger, the senior aide to President Richard Nixon and apostle of realpolitik, is quoted as saying that he wanted to make the French "drool" and think they could compete with Britain, weakening efforts for European unity.

France first tested an atom bomb in 1960 in the Sahara, becoming the fourth nation after the United States, Soviet Union and Britain to go nuclear as President Charles de Gaulle tried to project France as a great world power.

The United States under three presidents refused atomic cooperation with France as it worried about de Gaulle's foreign policy and feared he was setting off an arms race that would lead the divided Germans to seek nuclear weapons.

The declassified documents confirmed suspicions that Nixon quietly shifted course after entering the White House in 1969, concluding the United States could not stop France's program and should instead use it as leverage.

The documents were obtained by the National Security Archive at George Washington University and the Nuclear Proliferation International History Project at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Skirting US law that prevented direct nuclear assistance to France, the Nixon administration offered "negative guidance" by telling the French if their projects were headed in the right direction, the documents showed.

The French apparently were agreeable, with Robert Galley -- the defense minister under President Georges Pompidou -- asking the United States for guidance on building a nuclear warhead, the documents showed.

Kissinger, then Nixon's nuclear security adviser, said the United States would give information slowly and vowed: "I will brutalize Galley."

"What we want is something which makes Galley drool but doesn't give him anything but something to study for a while," Kissinger said in a 1973 memorandum.

He complained that Britain -- which was suspicious about Kissinger's views on what eventually became the European Union -- had not helped defend a key nuclear treaty between Nixon and the Soviet Union.

"The British are behaving shitty. If they know we have another option, they might buck up," Kissinger said.

Issue No. 910, 27 May 2011

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In a separate message to Nixon, Kissinger said the United States had "no obligation to bend over backward" for France. He doubted France would return to the NATO fold and complained of French policy toward Laos amid the Vietnam War.

But Kissinger concluded in another document: "We want to keep Europe from developing their unity as a bloc against us. If we keep the French hoping they can get ahead of the British, this would accomplish our objective."

The Nixon administration was an anomaly for the United States, which has largely supported European integration as a way to ensure peace on a continent ravaged twice by war in the 20th century.

Klaus Larres, a professor at the University of Ulster who is researching the era, said that the Nixon administration was primarily concerned that the European Community would become a trade rival at a time of US economic woes.

"Previous administrations had always gone out of their way to bring the Europeans on board and push them in the integration direction. That stopped with Nixon and Kissinger, mostly for economic reasons," he said.

William Burr, a senior analyst at the National Security Archive, said it was unclear how much France benefited from the US assistance as French documents on its nuclear program remained strictly classified.

"But the French kept asking for more, so it would suggest that they must have seen a benefit from this process," Burr said.

The United States and France officially agreed to start nuclear cooperation in 1996 under presidents Bill Clinton and Jacques Chirac. Two years later, India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons and were punished by sanctions.

http://www.spacewar.com/reports/US_secretly_helped_French_nuclear_program_documents_999.html

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

National Journal Daily

White House Threatens Veto of Defense Bill

By Megan Scully

Wednesday, May 25, 2011

The White House has threatened to veto the fiscal 2012 defense authorization bill if it keeps the alternate engine for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter on life support.

The administration, which has been involved in a long-simmering debate with Capitol Hill over the engine, delivered its veto threats on Tuesday afternoon, just as the House prepared to begin debate on the \$690 billion authorization measure.

The bill does not authorize any funding for the alternate engine, but it contains policy measures aimed at keeping the program alive—albeit at the expense of contractors General Electric and Rolls Royce. Pratt & Whitney builds the primary engine for the stealth fighter.

In its Statement of Administration Policy, the administration particularly took issue with language in the legislation to require the military to buy both engines if the Defense Department requires more power for the jets. The administration wrote that improvements to the engine are "likely to be needed," but argued that continuing to develop and procure the alternate engine would "destabilize" the F-35 program.

"If the final bill presented to the president includes funding or a legislative direction to continue an extra engine program, the president's senior advisers will recommend a veto," according to the SAP.

The White House also opposes language that requires the Defense Department to preserve the GE/Rolls Royce engines, arguing that it would add unnecessary costs. However, it does not appear that language could provoke a presidential veto of the sprawling defense bill.

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Interestingly, the White House did not react to language added during the House Armed Services Committee's markup earlier this month that requires GE and Rolls Royce to have access to the government-owned engines and test facilities—a provision that has been at the core of GE and Rolls Royce's lobbying efforts this year.

Over the last two administrations, the Pentagon has said the second engine is simply unaffordable and unnecessary. But supporters on Capitol Hill—particularly on the House Armed Services Committee—have countered that maintaining two engines would ultimately drive down costs and improve the product. The cancellation of the alternate engine, the committee has argued, would give Pratt & Whitney a lock on the \$110 billion international market.

In a significant victory for the administration, lawmakers voted earlier this year to strike \$450 million in funding for the second engine. Recognizing the political futility of persuading an increasingly deficit-conscious Congress to fund an expensive program the military doesn't want, GE instead pushed for access to the engines and test facilities. The firm has said it would dig into its own pockets to fund the program, which would cost upward of \$100 million annually.

The House will begin debate on the authorization measure on Wednesday, but no new engine-related amendments have been drafted. To avoid a veto, any controversial provisions would have to be stripped out or watered down during conference negotiations with the Senate later this year.

As it heads to the floor, the bill carries other veto threats—including language that the White House fears would tie its hands as it tries to implement the New START arms-reduction treaty with Russia. The provision, added to the bill during the markup, would delay full implementation of the treaty until after the secretaries of Defense and Energy update Congress on their plans to modernize the nation's nuclear infrastructure.

Nuclear modernization was the key issue during negotiations between the White House and Senate Republicans last year on New START. To assuage GOP concerns and get the 67 votes necessary for Senate approval of the treaty, the White House promised to spend \$85 billion over the next 10 years on updating warheads and modernizing the nuclear weapons complex.

The White House has also threatened to veto the bill over a similar provision that would require the president to report to Congress before making any changes to the United States' nuclear employment strategy. That language, according to the White House, raises "constitutional concerns as it appears to encroach on the president's authority as commander in chief."

President Obama also might wield his veto pen if the final bill includes many of the committee-endorsed provisions on holding and prosecuting detainees, including language that prohibits the administration from transferring certain detainees held at the military's detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to the United States.

Congress has inserted similar provisions in other bills, but the White House said the authorization language "unnecessarily constrains our nation's counterterrorism efforts and would undermine our national security, particularly where our federal courts are the best—or even the only—option for incapacitating dangerous terrorists."

<http://www.nationaljournal.com/daily/white-house-threatens-veto-of-defense-bill-20110524>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

International Business Times – New York
Thursday, May 26, 2011

Final House Military Budget Handcuffs Obama on Nukes, Detainees

The House of Representatives approved a \$690 billion defense budget that would limit President Obama's ability to reduce the country's nuclear arsenal and to transfer terrorism suspects.



Obama has made nuclear nonproliferation a centerpiece of his foreign policy, saying he envisions a world free of nuclear weapons while championing the New START treaty with Russia. The Republican-controlled House pushed back on that by making any moves to reduce the country's stock of nuclear weapons or move weapons subject to Congressional approval.

The budget also constrains Obama in guiding how terrorism suspects are tried, curtailing his authority to move suspects from Guantanamo Bay and mandating that all foreign terror suspects be tried in military tribunals.

Obama campaigned on a promise to close Guantanamo Bay, a position he has since reneged on. Civil liberties advocates have lambasted military tribunals, which they say establishes the dangerous precedent of a two-tiered justice system.

The Obama administration has threatened a veto of the bill, which would have to be reconciled with a yet to be drafted Senate version before it could become law.

<http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/152968/20110526/military-budget-house-budget-guantanamo-bay-nuclear-proliferation.htm>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

The Nation – Pakistan

Osama Raid an 'Act of War': Musharraf

May 25, 2011

Former Pakistan president Pervez Musharraf has said America's raid that killed Osama bin Laden was "technically an act of war" against his country.

"No country has a right to intrude into any other country," said Musharraf. Bin Laden was on May 2 killed by US Navy Seals in Abbottabad, a garrison town north of Islamabad, in a raid.

Musharraf described as "arrogance" President Barack Obama's comments this week that America would not hesitate to repeat a raid like that killed bin Laden.

"Actually, technically, legally, you see it, it's an act of war. So I think it is an irresponsible statement, and I think such arrogance should not be shown, publicly, to the world," he told Piers Morgan in an interview to CNN.

"Theoretically, technically, yes indeed, it's an act of war," he said, but noted it wouldn't necessarily signal a war. "How to deal with it is the question, and I leave it to the government there to how they want to deal with it."

<http://nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Politics/25-May-2011/Osama-raid-an-act-of-war-Musharraf>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

Foreign Policy

OPINION

Take Pakistan's Nukes, Please

The Taliban's brazen raid on a Karachi naval base shows why the Pakistani state can't be trusted with the world's most deadly weapons.

By KAPIL KOMIREDDI

May 24, 2011

For more than six decades, Pakistan has been at war with itself, torn between competing ideas of what it means to be Pakistani. In Pakistan's volatile trundle through history, the events that have unfolded so far this year -- the assassination of Governor Salman Taseer for expressing moderate views, the instant deification of his killer by a



substantial cross-section of the country's "civil society," the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan's most conspicuously military town -- may have resolved that conflict. The attack on Sunday, May 22, by Taliban fighters on the Mehran naval air base in Karachi -- its audacity, the foreknowledge it implied, the militaristic precision with which it was executed -- carried a message: Pakistan is no longer a contested territory; it is now emphatically their turf. The reins of official power may not be in their hands yet, but the men with whom they rest dare not challenge the extremists' conception of Pakistan. The battle for hearts and minds is over. Moderate Pakistan, if such a thing ever existed, is dead.

The Taliban insists that the attack on Mehran was payback for bin Laden's "martyrdom." This means that it took them less than three weeks to select their target, identify its assets -- the Orion P-3C aircraft -- and map out its most vulnerable points of entry. The attacks occurred on a day when U.S. personnel, more valuable than the aircraft, were on-site. It is inconceivable that this attack could have materialized without insider support. It was always known that a substantial number of Pakistan's armed forces -- 30 percent, by some estimates -- sympathized with the objectives of the forces they were fighting. The Pakistan Army will present Sunday's clash as proof of its valor in an attempt to assuage Pakistanis outraged by its incompetence. But the world must now acknowledge the fact that Pakistan's military is so deeply riven, its loyalties so thoroughly fractured, that it is incapable not only of defending Pakistan but is also dangerously unfit to be the custodian of its nuclear arsenal. It is time for Washington, Pakistan's principal paymaster in the West, to pursue the option of comprehensively denuclearizing Pakistan.

It is often said that Pakistan's decision to build the bomb was motivated by India's explosion of its own device in 1974. But in reality Pakistan's nuclear program was in response to the loss of East Pakistan in 1971. Founded as a safe haven for India's Muslims, Pakistan ended up perpetrating, over nine bloodcurdling months in 1971, the single biggest genocide of Muslims since the birth of Islam, slaughtering 3 million Bengalis, displacing 30 million, and turning half a million women into sex slaves. Pakistan has never offered an official apology, but at the peak of their inhumanity Pakistan's leaders persisted in presenting their country as a victim. As Ramachandra Guha documents in *India After Gandhi*, they described India's acceptance of 10 million refugees and its subsequent intervention as an "Indo-Zionist plot against Islamic Pakistan." One influential newspaper in Pakistan assured its readers that Pakistan would re-emerge with "renewed determination to unfurl the banner of Islam over the Kafir land of India." At the United Nations in New York, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, a feudal megalomaniac often unfairly accused of harboring democratic instincts, put on a spectacle, tearing up documents and pledging to "fight for 1,000 years as we have fought for 1,000 years in the past."

For a people conditioned to view in their country's creation a celestial affirmation of their own superior evolution, the crushing humiliation of defeat was impossible to endure. In 1972, Bhutto assembled Pakistan's top scientists and demanded a bomb in three years, according to British author Gordon Corera. He then flew to Tripoli, Libya, and, in the name of Islamic solidarity, persuaded Col. Muammar al-Qaddafi to fund the program. "Our resources are your resources," Qaddafi declared in 1974 to a Pakistani crowd gathered in an imposing sports stadium in Lahore dedicated in the Libyan leader's name. The same year, Bhutto authorized a young Pakistani metallurgist working on nuclear plants in the Netherlands to steal sensitive information. The memory of Muslim dispossession during India's partition haunted A.Q. Khan. "At one train station the soldiers pulled gold jewelry off of Muslim women and pulled the earrings out of their ears," he recalled decades later. He volunteered his services to Pakistan after witnessing the surrender of Pakistani troops in Dhaka. Pakistan's acquisition of the bomb was an improvised effort, involving high-level theft of data and undetected procurement of material by flouting Western export controls.

Khan eventually toured the world with his blueprints, selling varying levels of nuclear know-how to Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Syria, among other rogue states. The United States tracked his activities for years, and in 2004, under increasing U.S. pressure, Pakistan placed Khan under house arrest. In a confession broadcast live on television, Khan claimed to be the sole salesman of Pakistan's nuclear technology. If true, Khan's confession raises this question: How could he have gone undetected? A report by the U.S. Congressional Research Service updated this year confirmed that al Qaeda had sought Khan's assistance. If Khan's statement was false, then who else was



complicit in his nuclear trade? In 2005, a report by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction stated that al Qaeda "had established contact" with other Pakistani scientists to develop a nuclear weapon. A majority of Pakistan's nuclear sites are located in areas now dominated by the Pakistani Taliban, and between 2007 and 2008, they launched spectacular attacks on installations in Sargodha, Kamra, and Wah.

Nuclear weapons have earned Pakistan the illusion of prestige, but not security. Yet Pakistan latches on to them. Why? There are two reasons.

The first is India. Pakistan's sense of itself as the authentic home of India's Muslims cannot be vindicated as long as India remains a secular state encompassing the Muslim-majority province of Kashmir. Pakistan has waged three wars to wrest Kashmir from India, but the experience of defeat led Islamabad to wage low-cost terror warfare. Pakistan has repeatedly dispatched highly trained mobile teams to attack high-profile Indian targets -- from the attack on India's Parliament in 2001 to the bombing of its embassy in Afghanistan in 2008 and the siege of Mumbai the same year -- but India's ability to retaliate, even with surgical strikes on terrorist headquarters, is severely restricted by the threat of an all-out nuclear war. The nuclear weapons shield Pakistan from accountability.

The second reason is aid. Pakistan's ruling elite believes that America, terrified by the potential cost of dealing with nuclear Pakistan's failure, will always pay the price for its survival. It's an extraordinary pattern: Pakistan commits a crime, threatens instability, evades prosecution, and receives a bribe. But it cannot be sustained.

Khan once boasted about bestowing nuclear prestige on a country "where we can't even make a bicycle chain." Take away those nuclear weapons and Pakistan is a veritable basket case. It has no manufacturing base, and in the first four months of 2011 it managed to attract all of \$50 million in equity investment -- \$650 million less than Bangladesh managed in the depression year of 2009. Pakistan would benefit in more meaningful ways if it channeled its India obsession into energizing its economy.

Washington has often rushed to assuage Islamabad that it is not after Pakistan's nuclear weapons. But measured against the very real possibility that they may end up in the hands of extremists, U.S. intervention would serve to help rather than harm Pakistan.

The best way to rid Pakistan of its nuclear arsenal, as the *Wall Street Journal's* Bret Stephens has argued, is for Washington to offer to buy it. In return, Washington should offer Islamabad trade privileges and security guarantees -- even against India. Pakistan's history of selling its nuclear secrets to the highest bidders may, ironically, hold the key to expropriating its nuclear weapons. If Kim Jong Il can identify, isolate, and cultivate the right individuals, why can't the world's sole remaining superpower?

If incentives fail to move the generals in Rawalpindi, then Washington must be prepared to threaten Pakistan with isolation through U.N. mechanisms, including travel bans on its military leaders. Finally, Pakistan must be made to understand the cost of nuclear warfare. If a single nuclear warhead falls into the wrong hands -- or is pressed into service by the right hands -- there will be no Pakistan. Only denuclearization can now save Pakistan from itself -- and the world from Pakistan.

Kapil Komireddi is an Indian writer.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/24/take_pakistans_nukes_please?page=full

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

South Asia Analysis Group (SAAG) – India
OPINION/Analysis
May 25, 2011

Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Arsenal Safety Endangered

By Dr Subhash Kapila



Introductory Observations

Pakistan's nuclear weapons arsenal safety has been a source of serious concern for the international community ever since Pakistan's nuclear arsenal came into existence. Initially, international concerns focused on the unreliability of Pakistan as a 'responsible stakeholder' in nuclear stability, Pakistan's propensity for conflict including nuclear conflict against India and nuclear weapons proliferation to 'rogue nations'.

Pakistan's nuclear weapons arsenal safety acquired menacing contours more significantly ever since 9/11 when Pakistan emerged as the repository of nuclear weapon's proliferation and also the repository and citadel of Islamic Jihadi terrorism.

Osama Bin Laden's 9/11 was hatched, planned, and launched from the soil of Pakistan-Occupied Afghanistan and Pakistani soil itself and facilitated in a major way by Pakistan Army's notorious intelligence agency, the ISI.

The United States major unstated military concern ever since has been focused on the eventuality of Pakistani nuclear weapons or nuclear materiel's for making a 'dirty bomb' falling into the hands of the various terrorist organizations affiliated to Pakistan Army's ISI.

From 2006 onwards, Pakistani terrorist organizations at repeated intervals have endangered Pakistan's nuclear weapons storage sites and production complexes by launching attacks or moving into threatening proximity to locations like the Sargodha Air Base and the Wah military complex. In 2010 they had swooped from Swat to close to another Pakistan Air Force Base housing nuclear strike aircraft and the Pakistan Army was forced to move on threats of direct US military intervention.

Overtly, the United States pretends to agree with Pakistan Army's assertions that its nuclear weapons arsenal is safe and secure in the hands of Pakistan Army's special security organizations created for this purpose.

However, the United States misplaced trust on Pakistan Army's iron-clad guarantees on the safety of its nuclear weapons arsenal is taking a beating and wearing thin with repetitive incidents of Pakistani terrorist attacks on vital Pakistan Army installations and the General Headquarters itself.

In all such terrorists attacks on "High Security & Heavily Fortified Complexes" the common assessment of respected analysts has been that these would not have been possible without 'insider complicity' from within Pakistan Army's security organizations.

This week's audacious attacks on the Pakistan Navy Aviation Base at Mehran in close proximity of the Karachi International Airport and alongside the Pakistan Air Force Base, once again brings renewed focus on the safety of Pakistan's nuclear weapons arsenal

It would therefore be in order to renew one's focus on the safety of Pakistan's nuclear weapons arsenal once again when contextually Pakistan-United States strategic partnership itself stands endangered and dangers of Pakistan's implosion from within exist. The main theme of this Paper is examined under the following heads: (1) Pakistan Army's Nuclear Weapons Arsenal: Vulnerabilities of Storage Sites and Location of Production Complexes (2) Imperatives of Constant Shifting & Its Vulnerabilities (3) Islamist Sympathizers Within Pakistan Army Officers and Soldierly (4) The China Factor in Pakistan Army's Nuclear Weapons Arsenal Safety (5) Pakistan's Fail-Safe Measures Not Credible

Pakistan Army's Nuclear Weapons Arsenal: Vulnerabilities of Storage Sites and Location of Production Complexes

Pakistan in the initial stages had selected its nuclear weapons production complexes and storage sites related to its perceived military threat from India. To keep them out of reach from Indian air strikes it sited all its nuclear weapons sites on its Western peripheries or very nearly so.

Ironically, Pakistan Army's nuclear weapons storage sites and production complexes now fall into the very areas of Pakistani terrorist organizations sway or in close proximity to such areas.



With Pakistan Army having a tenuous hold on its Western frontier explosive regions, its nuclear weapons storage sites and production complexes perforce cannot be shifted. Currently they stand at increased risk of attacks and penetration by terrorist organizations which perceive that the Pakistan Army has sold its soul to the Americans and fighting America's war against them.

With the Pakistan Army itself as the main target of the Pakistani Taliban and it being besieged on other fronts, one wonders what military effectiveness the Pakistan Army can employ to combat its many threats not the least being the safety of its nuclear weapons arsenal.

Imperatives of Constant Shifting and Its Vulnerabilities

Pakistan Army is faced with a piquant situation where military imperatives exist for it to constantly shuttle its nuclear weapons storage sites even when they are stored in de-mated mode.

More than the Indian strikes threat, the Pakistan Army and its military hierarchy have become paranoid about the likelihood of a United States surgical strike to take out its nuclear weapons arsenal. This is found in the utterances of Pakistani Generals and analysts.

The shuttling around of Pakistan Army's nuclear weapons offers increased exposure to Pakistani terrorist organizations when such strategic assets are on the move irrespective of the most intense security cover provided.

Another aspect that finds mention in Pakistani discourse on the subject is that the Pakistan Army has the propensity to move its tactical nuclear weapons every time Pakistani terrorist attacks take place against India and the dangers of an Indian riposte. Under such situations Pakistani nuclear weapons assets are once again exposed to increased risk of falling in terrorists hands.

Some even go to the extent of suggesting that Pakistani terrorist organizations may deliberately engineer a Mumbai26/11 type attack so that in the ensuing scenario they can lay their hands on a Pakistan Army nuclear asset.

The reverse should also be accepted as a possibility in that the ISI engineers such an incident in which a plausible deniability exit would exist if it perceives that Pakistan strategic ends are being served.

Islamist Sympathizers Within Pakistan Army Officers and Soldiery

The real threat to Pakistan Army's nuclear weapons arsenal is not from the terrorists organizations per se. For such organizations to breach the multi-layered security that is claimed to be in place by the Pakistan Army would be a daunting task as breaching each ring would start alarm bells ringing and invite preemptive actions before the inner ring is breached.

The real threat to the safety and security to Pakistan Army's nuclear arsenal is posed from within by Islamist fundamentalist sympathizers amongst the Pakistan Army officers and soldiery. It is these elements who would act as the Trojan Horse for facilitating an inside access to Pakistani nuclear weapons arsenal.

It is these elements who can be instrumental in passing-on nuclear radioactive materials for a 'dirty bomb' to terrorists' organization. In this connection the reliability of Pakistani nuclear scientists is also worrisome as the past record shows.

The Pakistan Army would like the United States to believe that the selection and screening process for personnel of the security set-up for their nuclear weapons arsenal is stringent and credible. However that argument does not carry weight when a whole string of inside jobs in terrorists attacks against Pakistan military targets are taken into account.

The China Factor in Pakistan Army's Nuclear Weapons Arsenal Safety

The Pakistan Army's nuclear weapons arsenal owes its existence, follow-up production of increased number of nuclear weapons and technology updates to China. China therefore has a vested interest in the safety and security



of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. This vested interest arises not from any urges of being a responsible stakeholder in regional nuclear stability and security.

China's vested interest in the security of the Pakistan nuclear weapons arsenal stems from its strategic imperatives in the continued existence of a credible nuclear weapons arsenal of Pakistan to serve the ends of China's Grand Strategy focused on India and the United States.

If Pakistan's nuclear weapons arsenal is breached then surely it would invite United States military intervention and taking out of the Pakistan nuclear weapons capabilities. That would be a strategic catastrophe for China.

Would China be involved or is already involved in the security set-up of Pakistan Army's nuclear weapons arsenal is something only the United States, Pakistan and China would know?

Relatedly, it was strange that at the PNS MEHRAN attack by the Pakistani Taliban there were both Chinese and US military personnel at the same base. What were the Chinese doing there when the Pakistani Naval Aviation Base had only US origin aircraft stationed there?

Pakistan's Fail-Safe Measures Not Credible

Much has been written about the credibility of Pakistan's nuclear weapons security and fail-safe measures put into existence with millions of US dollars spent for this purpose. Much is also talked about the Permissive Action Links (PAL) mechanisms in place.

Experts point out that PAL comes into play only when the nuclear warhead is mated with the delivery system and not before. Therefore even if the United States is in a position to electronically jam Pakistani PAL systems to prevent launch of nuclear strikes, the United States with the information available in the public domain is not in a position to ensure that nuclear warheads or related nuclear materiel enroute for mating do not fall into the hands of terrorists organizations targeting the United States and India.

That can only be ensured by the Pakistan Army and by all current patterns the Pakistan Army either by incompetence or due to complicity with terrorists' organizations by Islamist fundamentalists within its officers and soldiery, has been unable to ensure.

The credibility of the fail-safe systems of Pakistan Army's nuclear weapons arsenal is therefore questionable?

Concluding Observations

Pakistan Army's nuclear weapons arsenal safety stands seriously endangered from the twin dangers of a deliberate operation by Pakistan Army's former terrorists organizations affiliates and the bigger danger of an 'insider job' facilitating the former by Islamist fundamentalists sympathizers within Pakistan Army officers and soldiery. It also adds to the trust-deficit in this critical field.

The Pakistan Army hierarchy has become paranoid about the likelihood of the United States military intervention to take out its nuclear weapons arsenal. This complicates the safety of Pakistani nuclear arsenal in multiple ways. The reliability of the Pakistan Army in such a scenario becomes doubly doubtful.

With dangers of Pakistan's internal implosion and strategic denouement in US-Pakistan strategic relationship and the ensuing trust-deficit, the credibility and the trust in the Pakistan Army to safeguard its nuclear weapons becomes that much eroded.

The United States alone has to ensure the neutralization of the Pakistan Army nuclear weapons arsenal.

The author is an International Relations and Strategic Affairs analyst. He is Consultant, Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group.

<http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/papers46/paper4505.html>

[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)



The Henry Jackson Society – U.K.

OPINION/Analysis

A Worrying Development for Trident

By Peter Cannon

25th May 2011

The announcement of an official study into alternatives to Trident, following the postponement of Trident's renewal, should be a cause for alarm.

Initial Gate and the study of alternatives

On 18th May, Defence Secretary Liam Fox announced that the Government had approved the 'Initial Gate' decision for the replacement of the UK's Trident nuclear deterrent. The main design choices and programme of work for the construction of the new submarines had been agreed, although the 'Main Gate' decision under which the new submarines would be built is not due until 2016. The Initial Gate decision was taken later than indicated under the Strategic Defence and Security Review, which stated that 'Initial Gate' would be approved by the end of 2010.

The Defence Secretary rightly stated: "The nuclear deterrent provides the ultimate guarantee of our national security, and for the past 42 years the Royal Navy has successfully operated continuous deterrent patrols to ensure just that." He rightly explained: "we cannot dismiss the possibility that a major direct nuclear threat to the UK might re-emerge. We simply do not know how the international environment will change in the next few years, let alone the next 50 years." The Defence Secretary reiterated: "I am absolutely clear that a minimum nuclear deterrent based on the Trident missile delivery system and continuous at-sea deterrence is right for the United Kingdom and that it should be maintained."

A more surprising element of the Defence Secretary's statement was that "to assist the Liberal Democrats in making the case for alternatives", there would be "the initiation of a study to review the costs, feasibility and credibility of alternative systems and postures. The study will be led by Cabinet Office officials overseen by the Minister for the Armed Forces" (Nick Harvey, a Liberal Democrat). While it was part of the Coalition Government's Programme for Government that the Liberal Democrats could continue to make the case for 'alternatives to Trident', an official Government study to examine these 'alternatives' was an entirely novel idea.

It is also a worrying one. Referring to the agreement between the Conservative and Labour Parties on replacing Trident, the Defence Secretary told the House of Commons that "Cross-party support adds greatly to the credibility of our deterrence policy, which is an essential part of the protection of our country." Given that, for the Government to be carrying out an official study into alternatives to the Trident system risks undermining the credibility of the UK's deterrence policy, by suggesting that the Government has not yet made up its mind on replacing Trident and that it is not giving this decision the seriousness which it deserves.

The previous decision to delay the Main Gate decision on Trident replacement until 2016, after the next general election, was one of the most worrying in the SDSR. Putting the decision off until after another election raises obvious questions about the very future of the deterrent, and indicates to the rest of the world that the British Government is not certain enough about the future of the deterrent to make a commitment.

The delay of Main Gate

The decision was particularly worrying as Nick Harvey, the Liberal Democrat Armed Forces Minister, had told the Liberal Democrat party conference just before the SDSR that if the decision was delayed, the Liberal Democrats could use the issue at the next election and apply political pressure to try to persuade the other two parties to modify their positions. He told the conference that a delay would not make a difference to the project but "is of profound political significance. Conservatives know that they are not going to be able to look to the Liberal Democrats to get that through Parliament, so the issue will be a hot potato for Labour." He argued that Labour



would have a "headache" over "whether they are going to ride to the rescue of the Conservative Party on Trident." He concluded: "The Liberal Democrats are not going to change our mind. As for Labour, watch this space. This story ain't over yet, it's going to run and run." This was an extraordinary approach for a defence minister to take to an issue of national security. It was even more extraordinary that, even after this open warning of the Liberal Democrats' intentions, the decision was still taken to delay Main Gate. In fact, there is little rationale to this decision other than an attempt to please the Liberal Democrat members of the Coalition and to put off a difficult and potentially divisive decision, even though the Coalition Programme for Government stated "We will maintain Britain's nuclear deterrent" and made no mention of a delay.

Following the SDSR, Ros Scott, the Liberal Democrats' president, e-mailed party members arguing that the delay was a "significant victory": "the Coalition Government announced that there will be no final decision on the like-for-like replacement of Trident during this parliament. So Trident will not be renewed this parliament - not on a Liberal Democrat watch. Let us be clear, this is a significant victory for Liberal Democrat campaigners, and a fantastic example of what our Ministers can and do achieve in government."

Alternatives to Trident?

The MP who opened the Liberal Democrat conference debate on Trident stated: "If it was up to me, I would scrap Trident today." It was clear that many of the delegates supported unilateral and complete nuclear disarmament. However, the official Liberal Democrat position is that to support an 'alternative' deterrent to Trident. There is, as of yet, no consensus as to what such an 'alternative' would be. The Cabinet Office would study the "costs, feasibility and credibility" of alternatives.

The alternatives which have been suggested thus far in discussions of the replacement of Trident are all deeply problematic.

Any alternative nuclear weapon system would require additional development and testing costs, and would be likely to involve a longer development process than the straightforward replacement of the existing Trident system. There is no evidence that a different weapon system could offer any improved capability compared to Trident. The legality of developing a new nuclear weapon system could also be questioned under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. There is therefore little or no benefit in deciding to replace Trident with a different system.

Trident is based on the principle of continuous at-sea nuclear deterrence. It can be used at any time against any target in the world, and is therefore always ready to respond against any threat. Its location is unknown. It therefore cannot be pre-empted or neutralised by a potential aggressor. Any alternative weapon system which ended the principle of continuous at-sea deterrence would leave the UK more vulnerable. It would reduce the deterrent effect, by opening up the possibility that there was not always a deterrent ready to be used at any time and against any target. The UK would not therefore be ever-ready to respond to an attack. A submarine-based deterrent which did not maintain a submarine continuously at sea could create potential 'windows of opportunity' for attack in the eyes of an aggressor. If a submarine was deployed at a time of heightened tension or crisis, as has been suggested by some who argue that the UK does not need to maintain continuous at-sea patrols, this could create panic at home and escalate any situation internationally. It could also be seen as a direct threat or a provocation by an enemy. In such a situation, such a submarine could be vulnerable to attack as it leaves its UK base.

Other alternatives to Trident also pose problems. Land-based ballistic missiles would be vulnerable to attack and pre-emption, as well as creating additional domestic security risks and costs. Cruise missiles do not have the range of ballistic missiles, reducing the UK's ability to respond. A cruise missile is also more vulnerable to being shot down, further reducing its deterrent effect. The UK nuclear warhead is also the wrong size to be fitted to a cruise missile, making such an alternative impractical. An airborne nuclear deterrent is also vulnerable to being shot down, and would only have a limited range.

Nick Harvey has also suggested the possibility of a shared British-French deterrent. But any system that was not completely independent and controlled by the UK at all times would not be able to provide the same level of



assurance as decision-making and responsibility could become confused and controversial, particularly at a time of crisis. Trident is operationally independent. The warheads are British and the system does not rely on US or other navigation satellites. The targeting is performed by the UK and firing authority rests with the Prime Minister.

Compared to such alternatives, Trident is clearly the best option for the UK. Other options would be costly, problematic and inadequate. Trident is the only system available to the UK which provides continuous at-sea deterrence and is every ready to be used against any target. Other weapon systems would not be able to guarantee this and would be vulnerable to pre-emption. There is no indication that any alternative can offer any better capability than Trident.

The BASIC Commission on Trident

Despite this, the announcement of an official study into alternatives may give credibility to the idea that Trident should be replaced by a substantially different system. The fact that the Cabinet Office is to work under the direction of Nick Harvey, who has made his opposition to Trident clear, and the fact that the study is designed "to assist the Liberal Democrats", raises questions over its impartiality.

The official study into alternatives to Trident coincides with a new 'independent, cross-party commission' to examine Trident renewal and UK nuclear weapons policy announced by the British American Security Information Council (BASIC), an organisation which describes itself as "a small but influential NGO with one very large idea:... a world free from the threat of nuclear weapons." BASIC announced that the delay to Main Gate presented a "window of opportunity" for such an exercise. The BASIC Commission intends to examine whether the UK should remain a nuclear weapons state, whether Trident is the best system and what more the UK can do to contribute to global disarmament. BASIC has recruited big names such as former defence secretaries Lord Browne and Sir Malcolm Rifkind, former Liberal Democrat leader Sir Menzies Campbell and former Chief of the Defence Staff Lord Guthrie.

Nick Harvey attended the parliamentary launch of the BASIC Trident Commission, and claimed that he could find little detailed argument from government officials justifying the UK's doctrine of continuous at-sea deterrence, saying: "When you looking for the paper trail, it is thin." He also complained: "Alternatives didn't seem to have been given detailed or objective assessments. The debate has been very much yes or no to this single notion of how a credible deterrent can be provided. Supporters of this policy come at it in a very single-minded way and anyone who does not agree is regarded as being implacably opposed to a deterrent of any kind. We now have a period of time for a mature debate about alternatives and approaches and the necessary work to be commissioned." Paul Ingram, executive director of BASIC, said that the government's recent decision to delay the start of construction for the new delay of Main Gate "guaranteed that this would be an election issue and that parties would need to be reconsidering their positions in the next few years prior to writing their manifestos".

The direction the BASIC Trident Commission is going in is therefore not difficult to discern. The project seems designed to promote the public questioning of Trident and the principle behind it by high-profile figures. Part of the BASIC Commission terms of reference, for example, is to examine 'potential defence budget impacts' and 'opportunity costs', promoting the idea that spending on Trident implies resources being taken away from the UK's conventional armed forces. This does not take into account the fact that by providing nuclear deterrence against an attack, Trident actually places less of the burden of deterrence on Britain's conventional forces, or the fact that either an alternative system or disarmament would both be expensive options. Nor would it be wise to make a decision over something as fundamentally important as a nuclear deterrent on the basis of short-term financial considerations. BASIC also promotes the idea that the START treaty between the US and Russia and Barack Obama's call for a nuclear-free world creates a 'new context' in which the British nuclear deterrent needs to be re-examined, despite the fact that a nuclear free-world remains a highly remote and distant prospect, that the other official nuclear weapon states are still retaining larger nuclear arsenals than the UK and that states such as Iran and North Korea show no sign of giving up their development of nuclear weapons.

Causes for concern over the future of Trident



The BASIC Trident Commission is likely to contribute to an intellectual and political atmosphere in which Trident is increasingly called into question, despite its advantages. Criticisms of Trident will be, and are, used by those who want to promote unilateral nuclear disarmament. The potential alternatives to Trident lack credibility and, thus far, any details. Rather, they seem to be more of a distraction aimed primarily at undermining the idea of Trident and at blocking or delaying its renewal, rather than serious suggestions for future nuclear deterrence.

The Defence Secretary is confident that the new study will reaffirm that Trident and continuous-at-sea-deterrence remain best for the UK and that the alternatives are not credible. However, the fact that he was recently criticised within the Government for 'bigging up' Iran's nuclear ambitions, while the SDSR merely says "We cannot discount the possibility that the number of states armed with nuclear weapons might increase", suggests that the Government is unwilling to publicly share his sense of urgency and certainty on nuclear issues. Taken after the postponement of the Main Gate decision until after the next election, the announcement of the new study into alternatives to Trident appears to be part of a worrying trend away from a firm commitment to renewing Trident. Given the insistence of the Defence Secretary and the Prime Minister that they remain committed to Trident and that the Government's policy is clear, and given all the other challenges facing UK defence policy, there is no justification for Government resources to be devoted to a study of alternatives to Trident which is intended to help the Liberal Democrats make the case for alternatives. This means that a political party are to be given official help to lobby against Government defence policy and to undermine the renewal of the nuclear deterrent. The UK's nuclear deterrent is far too important for decisions to be taken based on party political considerations. National security should outweigh party political sensibilities.

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[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

The Moscow Times - Russia
OPINION

Why Missile Defense Talks Will Fail

27 May 2011

By Ruslan Pukhov

At a news conference on May 18, President Dmitry Medvedev once again made the claim that the elements of a U.S. missile defense system to be deployed in Europe would actually be aimed against Russia because the "rogue" states for which they are ostensibly intended do not constitute a threat. Later, General Staff deputy chief Andrei Tretyak declared that the United States would be able to effectively intercept Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-based ballistic missiles by 2015 with the planned deployment of Washington's SM-3 missile defense system in Poland. U.S. President Barack Obama will visit Poland this weekend to discuss the missile defense plans.

A fatal flaw undermines Russia's objections. A technical analysis of the U.S. plans indicates that U.S. missile defenses, in their current configuration, will be unable to significantly reduce the strike potential of Russian ICBMs for the next 10 to 15 years. The 30 Ground Based Interceptor (GBI) systems currently deployed in Alaska and California are not capable of intercepting more than seven or eight Topol-M missiles. In their current Block I/IA configuration, the SM-3 missile defense systems deployed on U.S. ships are unlikely to be able to intercept Russian ICBMs and their warheads. Due to their location, the GBI systems deployed in Alaska and California would probably also prove ineffective at intercepting Russian ICBMs and are more likely intended for countering a potential threat from North Korea.

Eastern Europe, however, does appear to be a logical location for deploying a missile defense system to intercept intermediate-range and intercontinental missiles launched from Iran — should Tehran eventually develop them. If those missiles were launched toward Europe or North America, Romania and Poland really would be the optimal geographic center for deploying an interceptor system. At the same time, the ground-based SM-3 system that



the United States proposes deploying there would lack the necessary range to intercept Russian ICBMs launched from bases in Tatishevo and Kozelsk.

That shows that the U.S. missile defense system is basically focused on countering the missile threat posed by rogue states. But that is only half the picture. The real reason for Washington's large-scale missile defense work is much more far reaching, and this is what gives Russian politicians and military chiefs legitimate cause for concern.

The fundamental motivation behind U.S. missile defense is a desire to ensure the complete security of U.S. territory. When the Soviet Union first threatened U.S. security with its nuclear missiles in the 1960s — thereby ending its historical invulnerability — it came as a shock to U.S. citizens and shook up Washington's defense policy. It is not surprising that Washington's strategic goal ever since has been to restore the status quo ante. But technological and economic factors make it impossible to create a missile defense system that could guarantee protection to all U.S. territory in the event of a massive nuclear missile attack.

That is why Washington has set the goal of creating a limited missile defense system that would fend off a rudimentary missile attack by rogue states. At the same time, such a move is an intermediate step or testing ground toward creating a full-scale system.

Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once said something like: "Absolute security for one means a complete lack of security for everybody else." And that best describes Russia's position on U.S. missile defense. For Russia, preserving the effectiveness of its strategic nuclear forces is a categorical imperative to its national security. For relatively little expense, Russia's nuclear forces support the country's status as a great power, provide a military deterrent to other major powers, and enable it to maintain moderately sized conventional forces.

Even the hypothetical possibility that Russia's nuclear forces would be devalued threatens the foundation of Russia's military security. For that reason, opposition to an expanded U.S. missile defense system is one of the cornerstones of Russian security policy.

At the same time, Russia is unable to stop the U.S. missile defense program. A broad consensus exists in the United States for striving to provide the most complete protection possible against any missile attack on the country's territory. It is hopeless to hold talks with the United States on the subject of missile defense, just as there is no way to involve the United States in contractual obligations for chimerical "joint missile defense" projects.

President Dmitry Medvedev's proposal to create a pan-European missile defense system with Russia's participation also appears to be entirely unrealistic. Toward that end, Russia has offered use of its missile attack early warning system, primarily the installation in Gabala, Azerbaijan, and the Voronezh-DM unit in Armavir. But the West sees the missile defense offer as an attempt to paralyze or slow the creation of a U.S. missile defense system in Europe and therefore has no intention of striking a deal with Moscow.

Meanwhile, the downside to Russia's talk on joint missile defense is that it implicitly gives legitimacy to U.S. plans to create a limited missile defense system and erodes the clarity and integrity of the Russian position on the issue. Russia's actions undermine its own argument against the deployment of U.S. missile defense installations in Romania and Poland. That is why Russia's Western partners are willing to continue talks on a joint missile defense system while having no intention of actually working with Russia in that area.

And despite the general consensus among the Russian elite regarding U.S. missile defense plans, Moscow's foreign policy on the subject lacks consistency and coherency.

Considering that it has no political or diplomatic leverage it can use to stop or at least slow developments in the U.S. missile defense program, Russia must rely on a military and technical approach for countering it. This primarily means that it must upgrade the quantity and quality of its nuclear forces, and should create a new generation of heavy, ground-based multistage missiles to replace its SS-18 Satan series.



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[\(Return to Articles and Documents List\)](#)

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